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CADBURY TWENTY YEARS ON
CALLY JORDAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT all started innocuously enough: an industry committee struck in thewake of a spate of corporate scandals.  But even before the final report
appeared, it had captured public attention in the United Kingdom, much
to the astonishment of its authors.  The modern debate on corporate gov-
ernance had begun.
II. THE CADBURY REPORT 1992
The London Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council, and
the accountancy profession in the U.K. published their committee report,
“The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance” on 1 December 1992,
some twenty years ago.  The report quickly became known by the name of
its chairman, Sir Adrian Cadbury, as the “Cadbury Report.”  It had begun
as a modest exercise in response to several high profile cases of corporate
fraud and director malfeasance.
In particular, the dramatic disappearance of Jan Ludvik Hoch off his
yacht in the Canary Islands on November 5, 1991 had captured headlines
and fuelled public anger in the U.K.  He had simply vanished, and so had
funds from the employee pension funds of the companies he operated.
Born in the former Czechoslovakia, he was known in the U.K. as Robert
Maxwell and held sway over a newspaper empire.  At the time of his disap-
pearance, there was much speculation as to what had occurred.  Did he
slip?  Did he commit suicide in remorse?  Did an irate defrauded pen-
sioner push him?  Or, perhaps, in a James Bond moment, he was spirited
away by helicopter to a new life in an unknown location?1  This was the
stuff of tabloid news and caught the imagination of the public.
* Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School and Academic Member of the
European Corporate Governance Institute, c.jordan@unimelb.edu.au.
1. According to Wikipedia, this was quite literally a James Bond moment.  The
disappearance of Robert Maxwell inspired the end of the 18th Bond film Tomorrow
Never Dies, in which the villain was a newspaper magnate who tried to take over the
(1)
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To the surprise of Sir Adrian Cadbury and his colleagues, the
Cadbury Report was an unlikely bestseller:
When our Committee was formed . . . neither our title nor our
work programme seemed framed to catch the headlines.  In the
event, the Committee has become the focus of far more attention
than I ever envisaged . . . .  The harsh economic climate is partly
responsible, since it has exposed company reports and accounts
to unusually close scrutiny.  It is, however, the continuing con-
cern about standards of financial reporting and accountability,
heightened by BCCI, Maxwell and the controversy over directors’
pay, which has kept corporate governance in the public eye.2
The focus of the Committee had been a fairly narrow one, the control and
reporting functions of boards of directors and the role of auditors, how-
ever the proposals sought “to contribute positively to the promotion of
good corporate governance as a whole.”3  Although the report and its ap-
pendices run to some ninety pages, “the heart”4 of the report, and what
made it famous, was the Code of Best Practice which would be imple-
mented by the London Stock Exchange.  The Code of Best Practice was
succinct and to the point; barely two pages long.5  It raised the issue of
separating the role of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman; sug-
gested the use of non-executive directors (NEDs) and the desirability of
independence; recommended the appointment of NEDs to an audit com-
world from a boat, where a final fight scene takes place. See Robert Maxwell,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Maxwell (last modified Sept. 14,
2012, 4:03 PM) (providing overview of Robert Maxwell’s life).  On a more serious
note, the BBC reported that his body was recovered from “the sea off the Canary
Islands after he had been reported missing from his private yacht.” Robert Maxwell:
A Profile, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION (Mar. 29, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/business/1249739.stm.  Likewise, the Guardian also published a report that
Maxwell’s body was found after being missing for at most one day. See Ben Lau-
rance et al., Maxwell’s Body Found in Sea, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 1991), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/politics/1991/nov/06/politicalnews.uk.
2. ADRIAN CADBURY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 9 (1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/docu-
ments/cadbury.pdf. [hereinafter CADBURY REPORT].
3. Id. at 11.
4. See id. (stating “Code of Best Practice” is main part of Committee’s
recommendations).
5. See id. at 57–59.  The main provisions of the Code of Best Practice delineate
an ideal relationship between the roles of directors (both executive and non-exec-
utive), shareholders, and auditors.  The key provisions are provided in sections 1.1,
2.1, 3.1, and 4.1.  Section 1.1 states: “[t]he board should meet regularly, retain full
and effective control over the company and monitor the executive management.”
Id. at 58.  Section 2.1 states: “[n]on-executive directors should bring an indepen-
dent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, including
key appointments, and standards of conduct.” Id.  Section 3.1 states: “[d]irectors’
service contracts should not exceed three years without shareholders’ approval.”
Id. at 59.  Section 4.1 states: “[i]t is the board’s duty to present a balanced and
understandable assessment of the company’s position.” Id.
2
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mittee of the board of directors, all in the interests of providing some
oversight and checks and balances to corporate decision making.6
Audit committees and non-executive directors were not new; the
Cadbury Report itself was picking up the provisions from the New York
Stock Exchange listing rules.  Separation of CEO and Chairman of the
board, however, was a more European than American approach, harken-
ing to the German governance structures of the dual board, where the
Supervisory Board provides oversight (with no overlap) to the Manage-
ment Board.  So there were no radically new propositions in the Code of
Best Practice of the Cadbury Report.  The propositions, though, were
stated simply and were clearly articulated.  Variations on these proposi-
tions have proliferated over time.
Perhaps the greater significance of the Cadbury Report lies else-
where.  Two features stand out.  First, the Cadbury Report provided a
short and sweet definition of corporate governance: “Corporate govern-
ance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.”7  An-
swering the question, “what is corporate governance?,” has always been
fraught with difficulty.  The Cadbury definition has proved remarkably en-
during, being picked up repeatedly in the corporate governance literature
around the world.  It is the definition used by the OECD and the latest
iteration of the Code of Best Practice, the U.K. Corporate Governance
Code 2010.
Despite its deceptive simplicity, the Cadbury Report definition of cor-
porate governance is problematic and should be approached with caution.
Even in the U.K., it may, in fact, not represent a modern understanding of
corporate governance.  A few years after the Cadbury Report appeared,
Professor Kenneth Scott of Stanford Law School provided a more nuanced
but equally problematic answer to the question “What is corporate
governance?”
In its most comprehensive sense, “corporate governance” in-
cludes every force that bears on the decision-making of the firm.
That would encompass not only the control rights of the stock-
holders, but also the contractual covenants and insolvency pow-
ers of debt holders, the commitments entered into with
employees and customers and suppliers, the regulations issued by
governmental agencies, and the statutes enacted by parliamen-
tary bodies.  In addition, the firm’s decisions are powerfully af-
fected by competitive conditions in the various markets in which
it operates.  One could go still further, to bring in the social and
cultural norms of the society.  All are relevant, but the analysis
6. See id. at 58–59.
7. Id. at 15.
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would become so diffuse that it risks becoming unhelpful as well
as unbounded.8
The factors which Scott identifies (the exercise of shareholder voting
power, creditors’ contractual rights and powers in insolvency, commit-
ments to employees, customers and suppliers, the interplay of regulation
and statute, social and cultural norms) are of much greater significance
now than at the time of the Cadbury Report.  Implicit in the legislative and
societal framework in which corporations operate in many places in the
world, these factors have now taken express legislative form in the recent
U.K. Companies Act 2006.9  Thus, in spite of its popularity, the Cadbury
Report definition of corporate governance may have been overtaken by
events.
The second significant feature of the Cadbury Report, also problem-
atic, is the way in which its proposals were to be implemented:
The London Stock Exchange intend to require all listed compa-
nies registered in the United Kingdom, as a continuing obliga-
tion of listing, to state whether they are complying with the Code
and to give reasons for any areas of non-compliance. . . .  The
obligation will be enforced in the same way as all other listing
obligations.  This may include, in appropriate cases, the publica-
tion of a formal statement of censure.10
Thus was born the voluntary code of corporate governance, and its associ-
ated “comply or explain” implementation mechanism.
At this point, it is useful to remember that the Cadbury Report could
do little else.  It was a private sector initiative (the London Stock Ex-
change, the Financial Reporting Council, and the accountancy profes-
sion).  It was not a government-led regulatory initiative and could thus not
suggest recourse to more robust implementation measures, although it
might have suggested more coercive use of the contractual listing rules
(“comply or delist,” perhaps).
But the most remarkable phenomenon associated with the Cadbury
Report is how quickly it proliferated and how internationally influential it
became.  In the U.K. itself, it proved somewhat controversial, triggering
successive waves of rethinking, recalibration, reports and “codes,” culmi-
nating most lately in the U.K. Corporate Governance Code of 2010 and its
8. Kenneth E. Scott, Corporate Governance and East Asia 2–3 (Stanford Law Sch.
John M. Olin Program in Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 176, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=173369.
9. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 174 (Eng.) (describing duty directors of
companies have to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence).
10. CADBURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. R
4
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companion, the U.K. Stewardship Code 2010.11  As a result, the Cadbury
Report went viral.12
There are a number of possible reasons for this.  The Cadbury Report
was the initiative of the London Stock Exchange, the most international of
all exchanges at the time with hundreds of non-U.K. companies listed and
news of the Cadbury Report would have spread quickly internationally.13
Secondly, this period marked the beginning of the great re-alignment
among exchanges around the world; exchanges were well connected
through industry associations (for example, the World Federation of Ex-
changes, the Federation of European Securities Exchanges),14 and closely
monitored developments in competing markets.  In addition, there was
the usual, and often underestimated, old colonial network of the Com-
monwealth.15  Commonwealth countries span the globe, encompassing
economies at all levels of development and remain to this day surprisingly
interconnected through the persistence of legislative and judicial legacies.
The proposals themselves were also attractive in their simplicity, making
them accessible to a broad audience, as well as being championed by an
appealing and well-known figure, Sir Adrian Cadbury.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GOES GLOBAL
Significantly, in addition to propagation and replication at national
levels, primarily through Commonwealth channels, the Cadbury Report
laid the groundwork for the development of international standards of
corporate governance.  Here is a most interesting and reinforcing phe-
nomenon: a national level initiative, very much a product of its own time
and place, is shot into the international stratosphere to form the nucleus
11. See infra note 74 (discussing impact and implementation of U.K. Corpo-
rate Governance Code and U.K. Stewardship Code). See generally FIN. REPORTING
COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2010), available at http://
www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/b0832de2-5c94-48c0-b771-ebb249fe1fec/The-UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code.aspx; FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP
CODE (2010), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/FRC/The-UK-
Stewardship-Code.aspx.
12. This is all the more remarkable, given that at the time of its appearance,
the internet was in its infancy.
13. Arguably this is still the case.
14. The World Federation of Exchanges was founded in 1961.  The Federa-
tion of European Securities Exchanges was founded in 1975.
15. For example, the Cadbury Report in the U.K. was quickly followed the
next year by a similar report in Canada. See TORONTO STOCK EXCH. COMM. ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, WHERE WERE THE DIRECTORS?: GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVED
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA (1994) [hereinafter DEY REPORT]; see also
CHOW MAN YIU, CHIEF EXECUTIVE’S REVIEW (2006), available at http://www.hkex.
com.hk/eng/exchange/invest/finance/2005/documents/f107_05.pdf (providing
Hong Kong Exchange’s strategic plan to provide world-class marketplace for Hong
Kong); KING COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, KING REPORT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (1994).
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of free-floating international standards.  International standards then be-
come the benchmark for national and even firm-level initiatives.
In this case, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) provided the forum, and the Cadbury Report the cata-
lyst.  In April 1998, the OECD published a short, and not particularly
memorable, report, “Corporate Governance: Improving Competitiveness
and Access to Capital in Global Markets” (“OECD Report”).16  Notable is
the change in emphasis: “competitiveness” and “access to capital” replaced
the “high standards of corporate behavior” and “accountability” of the
Cadbury Report.
The corporate governance debate had crossed the Atlantic; the chair
of the OECD Report was a senior Wall Street lawyer, Ira Millstein.  But Sir
Adrian Cadbury was sitting right beside him.  The OECD Report was some-
what inconclusive, demonstrating internal tensions and decidedly the
product of a committee representing the usual suspects of various domi-
nant national viewpoints of the time (Germany, France, Japan, the United
States, and the U.K.).17  In the words of the OECD Report,
“[e]xperimentation and variety should be expected.”18
It was a report that could have gone on to collect dust in the archives.
However, something surprising happened.  Barely a year later appeared a
full-blown set of international standards, the OECD Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance 1999 (“OECD Principles 1999”).  The OECD Principles
1999 were not the product of experimentation and variety; they had been
commandeered by the Anglo-American duo, Millstein and Cadbury, who
became their international champions in appearances around the world.
A U.K. code of corporate governance had been transformed into a set of
international standards wrapped within the framework of the U.S. Revised
Model Business Corporations Act.19  The OECD Principles 1999 broad-
ened the focus of the original Cadbury Report (which, because of its some-
16. See BUS. SECTOR ADVISORY GRP. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MAR-
KETS—A REPORT TO THE OECD BY THE BUSINESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE (1998) [hereinafter OECD REPORT], available at http://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/corporate-governance-improving-competi
tiveness-and-access-to-capital-in-global-markets_9789264162709-en  (presenting re-
port regarding corporate governance to contribute positively to economic per-
formance of corporations in OECD countries).
17. The committee writing the report was composed of Ira Millstein (Weil
Gotshal, New York), Sir Adrian Cadbury (U.K.), Michel Albert (Banque de
France), Robert Denham (Salomon Inc., New York), Dieter Fedderson (German
lawyer with U.S. firm White & Case), and Nobuo Tateisi (Japanese executive, grad-
uate of Columbia Business School, New York).
18. OECD REPORT, supra note 16, at 8 (noting corporate governance practices R
are constantly evolving and there is no universal model or final structure in corpo-
rate governance that all countries and corporations should follow).
19. Note that even in the OECD Report of 1998, which clearly reflected non
Anglo-American perspectives, both the German and Japanese representatives had
strong New York connections.
6
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what narrow mandate, had focused on directors and accountability) to
bring shareholders into the picture but subsumed all the associated under-
lying assumptions of the so-called “Anglo-American” model of the time:
widely dispersed shareholders, the textbook “agency” problem, unitary
board structure, little consideration given to “stakeholders,” and so on.
Codes of corporate governance, based on the OECD Principles 1999,
spread like wildfire across the globe, due to a confluence of circumstances.
There was the credibility and backing of the OECD, of course, with its
regional roundtable programs being particularly effective propagators.
The OECD Report of 1998 had specifically identified the promotion of
access to capital as a goal of corporate governance; capital markets were
rapidly internationalizing.  During this period there was also an explosion
of crisis-driven international financial standard setting.  In this case, trig-
gered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998.
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank engaged in the propagation of interna-
tional financial standards with missionary zeal.  The OECD Principles 1999
appeared just as the Financial Stability Forum (“FSF”)—the predecessor
institution to the current Financial Stability Board—was established and
the Financial Sector Assessment Program (“FSAP”) launched by the IMF
and the World Bank.  The IMF had been caught flat-footed by the Asian
financial crisis and much criticized.  The FSAP exercises, whereby the fi-
nancial systems of countries were benchmarked and rated, country-by-
country, against sets of international financial standards were designed to
act as both a prophylactic and an early warning system.20  The FSF for-
mally adopted twelve sets of international financial standards for this pur-
pose, including the OECD Principles 1999.  Small armies of international
bureaucrats, the book of international financial standards in hand, fanned
out across the globe to spread the word.
In January 1999, the author, then newly engaged World Bank staff,
was sent, OECD Principles 1999 in hand, to Indonesia to promote their
adoption as part of the crisis resolution team.  A classic confrontation of
legal cultures ensued in meetings with leading legal practitioners in
Jakarta.  What did the OECD Principles 1999 mean when referring to “di-
rectors?”; Indonesia had a European style dual board structure.  Why
would one need independent directors (and on what board) in a dual
board structure?  What is the role of an audit committee (and what is it a
committee of) where there is an internal audit board?  How do these prin-
ciples apply to state-owned enterprises or majority controlled listed corpo-
rations?  All very good questions, demonstrating the difficulties associated
with dropping assumption-ridden “international” standards into non-na-
tive legal environments.
20. See Cally Jordan, The Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards
and the Legacy of the Financial Stability Forum, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 333, 346
(2011) (explaining role of FSF and FSAP).
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IV. AN ACCELERANT TO THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WILDFIRE:
THE LEGAL ORIGINS LITERATURE
In the case of international corporate governance standards, there
was an additional accelerant to the wildfire of the OECD Principles 1999:
the “legal origins” literature, which began to appear at about the same
time.21  Some financial economists immediately contested the legal ori-
gins theories.
First, it does not seem that legal or cultural impediments to fi-
nancial development are as serious as one might have concluded
from recent literature.  Somewhat facetiously, one does not have
to have the good fortune of being colonized by the British to be
able to have vibrant financial markets.  However, the main im-
pediment we identify—the political structure within the coun-
try—can be as difficult to overcome as more structural
impediments.22
Misguided though this literature was, it was extremely influential, and rap-
idly became conventional wisdom.  This literature looked to the two main
legal traditions in developed economies, the Anglo-American common law
tradition and the continental European “civil” or Romano-Germanic legal
tradition, to conclude that the level of legal enforcement and the origin of
21. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/paper
(examining legal rules concerning protection of corporate creditors and share-
holders, their origin, and quality of their enforcement in forty-nine countries);
Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3
(2000), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/56_IP_Corp
Gov.pdf; Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN.
1147 (2002), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.
1.11.8336.  More recently, see Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?
(Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://www.ssrn.
com/abstract=425880.  The legal origins literature referred to in this article is pri-
marily based on the La Porta studies:
Because legal origins are highly correlated with the content of the law,
and because legal families originated before financial markets had devel-
oped, it is unlikely that laws were written primarily in response to market
pressures.  Rather the legal families appear to shape the legal rules, which
in turn influence financial markets.
Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra, at 9, 21 (noting that “legal rules
do matter”).  For a comprehensive discussion of the literature, see Katharina Pistor
et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 791 (2002).
22. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of
Financial Development in the Twentieth Century 35 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev.
Econ. Dept., Working Paper No. 265, 2000).  Legal academics in the United States
have responded in a variety of ways, ranging from gentlemanly chiding to outright
parody. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002); Mark
D. West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success (Univ. of Mich. John M. Olin
Center for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 02-009, 2002), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=318940.
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the rules correlated to the level of development of both equity and debt
markets.23  Measures of investor protection appeared superior in common
law countries and translated into more vibrant equity markets, they
surmised from their findings.24  Crudely put, it came to stand for the pro-
position that “Anglo-Saxon” or common law legal systems were superior in
promoting the development of financial markets.
In particular, the legal origins literature was picked up by the interna-
tional financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, and
rolled into their financial sector assessment processes, as well as its subse-
quent refinement sponsored and conducted by them.25  Legal origins au-
thors made frequent appearances at various forums sponsored by the
international financial institutions.  The propositions behind the legal ori-
gins literature proved very convenient, fuelling the debate on the inevita-
ble convergence of legal norms to international (read: common law)
standards.  The legal origins literature justified the transplantation, or
more coercively, the imposition, of handy Anglo-American legal concepts
and models around the world, irrespective of their appropriateness or
likely effectiveness.  The OECD Principles 1999 fit the bill perfectly.
Cadbury-esque corporate governance codes popped up like mushrooms
everywhere, from Algeria to Yemen.26
V. RECASTING LEGAL ORIGINS
However, the rush towards adoption of international standards and
quick fix voluntary codes of corporate governance ignored some very basic
tenets of how legal systems adapt and change.  Legal origins do matter,
but not in the way postulated by the legal origins literature, which over-
looks the complexity and dynamism of legal systems.  The legal origins
literature also just got the law wrong, but that is a different issue.
With its groundings as a customary law and a long tradition of self-
regulation, the English common law system27 is quite open to industry-
specific initiatives, which do not take legislative form.  Legislation, written
23. See generally William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corpo-
rate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213 (1999).
24. See id. at 228–30.
25. At an APEC meeting in Sydney, Australia, in late 1998, the author was
presented with an early draft of one of the first in the series of legal origins papers;
it had purportedly been commissioned by the International Finance Corporation,
a member of The World Bank Group.
26. By one count, and not an exhaustive one at that, there are nearly one
hundred countries, regions and organizations that have adopted corporate govern-
ance codes.  A list of national corporate governance codes and reports is available
at European Corporate Governance Institute’s website. See, Index of Codes, EURO-
PEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INST., http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php
(last visited June 5, 2012).
27. Not to be confused with the U.S. legal system, which demonstrates quite
different characteristics despite its origins in the English common law.
9
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law, has been traditionally seen as a last resort, representing a failure of
the common law (based on custom and the judiciary).  Until very recent
times, if anything, there was a palpable aversion to written legislation.
Legislative “codes,” in the continental European sense, smacked of revolu-
tion and the barricades.  So sector-specific “voluntary” initiatives may have
considerable persuasive force in such a system.  These are codes as “a set
of conventions or moral principles governing behaviour in a particular
sphere” in one sense of the term, according to the Oxford English
Dictionary.28
However, in continental European legal systems, primacy of place is
given to written legislation, in a multitude of forms (constitution, execu-
tive decree, civil and commercial codes, special statutes, etc.).  The con-
cept of a “voluntary” code, in such systems, is an oxymoron.  Codes are a
very strong form of formal written legal rule, trumping statute in the legis-
lative hierarchy, second only to the constitution.  These are codes, in the
sense of the Oxford English Dictionary, “a systematic collection of laws or
statutes.”29
The U.S. legal system, for various historical reasons, demonstrates
strong influences from each formative system; there is a lot of written law
in the United States, as well as a judicially crafted common law.
In many respects US law represents a deliberate rejection of com-
mon law principle, with preference being given to more affirma-
tive ideas clearly derived from civil law.  These were not somehow
reinvented in the United States but taken over directly from civil-
ian sources in a massive process of change in adherence to legal
information in the nineteenth century.30
As a means of looking at how various corporate governance mechanisms
operated in legal systems around the world, Cally Jordan and Mike
Lubrano in 2002 identified a “dynamic corporate governance contin-
uum.”31  The same corporate governance mechanism could be expressed
in different ways and different forms in different places.  Sometimes a
“rule” would take several different forms contemporaneously, in a rein-
forcing fashion; sometimes “rules” would slide back and forth over time
along the continuum, depending on prevailing circumstances.
28. See Code, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/defini-
tion/english/code (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
29. See id.
30. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 230 (2d ed. 2004).
31. See generally Cally Jordan & Mike Lubrano, How Effective Are Capital Markets
in Exerting Governance on Corporations?, in FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE
ROLES OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 327 (Robert E. Litan, Michael Pomerle-
ano & V. Sundararajan eds., 2002).
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THE DYNAMIC CONTINUUM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES32
Quasi-
Legal Standards of Private/
Sensibilities Behavior Private Rules Public Rules Public Rules
StockEx Moral Voluntary Contract Exchange LegislationAnte Obligation Codes Listing Rules
Ex Moral Reputational Specialized JudicialArbitrationPost Opprobrium Consequences Arbitration Action
Less formal < > More formal
In the unitary board systems of the common law, audit committees
are an example.  In the U.K., the requirement for audit committees re-
mains embedded in the “voluntary” codes—Cadbury and its progeny.  In
the United States, the audit committee originated in the 1978 New York
Stock Exchange rules (which is where Cadbury picked it up); but it was a
mandatory requirement for all NYSE listed companies (and not a comply
or explain rule).  Canada had made the audit committee a statutory re-
quirement for publicly traded corporations under the Canada Business
Corporations Act of 1975.33  In 2002, in the United States, the audit com-
mittee requirement moved along the continuum into statute, and became
applicable to all publicly traded corporations (a much larger universe than
NYSE listed corporations), with enactment of the infamous Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.34
AUDIT COMMITTEES: ONE RULE, THREE FORMS
VOLUNTARY CODE SEMI-PUBLIC
(STANDARD OF (CONTRACT PLUS Public
CONDUCT) STATUTORY BACKING) (Legislation)
U.K. Cadbury Report/ NYSE Listing Rules Canada BusinessCombined Code (1992/ (1978)—mandatory Corporations Act 19751998/2008)
London StockU.K. Code of Corporate Sarbanes-Oxley 2002Exchange—comply orGovernance 2010 (U.S.)explain
Notable here is the persistent adherence, in the U.K., to the voluntary
code of corporate governance established by the Cadbury Report.
32. See Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 983, 998 (2005). These insights have since been picked up in the “hard law”/
“soft law” debate in the wake of the financial crisis and a renewed interest in
international financial standard setting.  See Chris Brummer, How International
Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011).
33. See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
34. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
745 (noting audit committee requirement for public companies).
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VI. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES ABROAD
So, how did these Cadbury-style corporate governance codes fare
outside of the U.K.? Three examples are discussed below: China, Ger-
many, and Italy.
A. China—Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics
China was an early adopter.  A “Code of Corporate Governance for
Listed Companies”35 appeared in 2001, soon after the OECD Principles
1999.  The Code followed “commonly accepted standards in international
corporate governance” and followed the structure of the OECD Principles
1999.36  There the similarities ended for the most part.  This Code was
hardly voluntary, taking the form of a regulatory decree.  Despite the su-
perficial similarity in organization to the OECD Principles 1999, the con-
tent of the Code was quite different.  It contained statements such as:
“assets of a listed company belong to the company.”37  The company as a
legal institution was brand new in China, the first modern companies act
at that time having come into effect only six years before.  The major pur-
pose to be served by that legislation was “corporatization” of state-owned
enterprises so as to permit partial flotation on domestic and foreign stock
exchanges (but with the state remaining firmly in control).  Again, despite
superficial (and quite deliberate) resemblances to English and European
companies, these Chinese companies were very different beasts under-
neath the surface.
Rapid change is the norm in China though, and by 2006 there was a
new, much more sophisticated companies law in place, adapted to a wider
variety of purposes.  The new legislation includes a specific corporate gov-
ernance section, entitled “Special Provisions on Organizational Structure
of Listed Companies.”38  And what do we find in that section, but some of
the “indicia” of investor (shareholder) protection from the legal origins
35. See CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMM’N, CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR LISTED COMPANIES (2001), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/
newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69223.htm (promoting establishment and
improvement of modern enterprise system by listed companies, standardizing op-
eration of listed companies, and bringing forward healthy development of securi-
ties market in China).
36. See id. (setting forth basic principles for corporate governance of listed
companies in China).
37. See id. (making statements such as “assets of a listed company belong to
the company”).
38. See Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) § 5
(China), available at http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en/pages/p1075/p1075_
content/Companies%20Law%20of%20the%20People’s%20Republic%20of%20
China.pdf (including specific corporate governance section in new Chinese com-
panies law).
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literature.39  In particular, it includes the peculiar concept of cumulative
voting, drawn from U.S. corporate law textbooks.
Early legal origins literature had identified the presence of certain
“anti-director” mechanisms, such as cumulative voting, as indicative of ef-
fective company level corporate governance.40  Statutory cumulative vot-
ing originated in the United States as a procedural mechanism designed
to enhance minority shareholder representation at the board level, in the
absence of charter or statutory provisions on direct representation.  Ac-
cording to Jeffrey Gordon at Columbia Law School, in the United States,
its “application to shareholder voting is a path-dependent historical odd-
ity.”41  Cumulative voting is a procedural voting mechanism, and a cum-
bersome one at that,42 under which minority shareholders have a chance
(but only a chance) for some degree of representation on the board of
directors.43
Although cumulative voting might be moderately useful in achieving
its purposes in a corporation with a small number of shareholders, or one
with another form of concentrated ownership, in such cases there are usu-
ally better mechanisms available.44  Most importantly though, cumulative
voting would never deliberately be used in a listed company in the United
States (it does not work), and is not an indicator of good corporate gov-
ernance at all.45  In the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis
39. See id. (discussing indicia of investor protection).
40. See supra note 26 (discussing indications of effective company level corpo-
rate governance).
41. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumula-
tive Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 142 (1994).  The accepted story of the introduc-
tion of cumulative voting in the United States is truly a bit bizarre:
As part of the Illinois constitutional revision of 1870, adherents of pro-
portional representation won a major battle to require cumulative voting
for the Illinois House of Representatives.  The principle having prevailed,
the constitutional convention also required cumulative voting in the elec-
tion of directors for private corporations.  The objective was to protect
minority interests against overreaching by a majority, particularly in cir-
cumstances in which representation on the board would give the minority
the information necessary to police against fraud.
Id.
42. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 534 (8th ed. 2003) (“One undesirable aspect of cumulative voting is
that it tends to be a little tricky.  If a shareholder casts votes in an irrational or
inefficient way, he may not get the directorships his position entitles him to; when
voting cumulatively it is relatively easy to make a mistake in spreading votes
around.”).
43. For a historical analysis of cumulative voting, see Gordon, supra note 41.
44. For example, shareholder agreements and the use of voting groups.
45. The inclusion of cumulative voting in the legal origins literature as “anti-
director” indicia is an example of how the legal origins literature got the law
wrong.
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and at the urging of Washington advisors, Korea has had several unhappy
experiments with cumulative voting.46
The inappropriateness of dropping OECD Principles 1999 into China
in 2001 is pretty obvious, as would be the utilization of a Cadbury-style
corporate governance code developed for the commercial environment in
the modern City of London.  Equally, by 2006, serious questions were aris-
ing as to the legal origins literature and its indicia, such as cumulative
voting.
It appears that the Chinese were deliberately adopting at least the
semblance of the prevailing corporate governance orthodoxy, so as to take
advantage of a signalling effect to international capital markets.  U.S. insti-
tutional investors recognized the signal, which means the domestic market
has become aware of and taken up the corporate governance debate.47
The existence of a corporate governance code purporting to be in accor-
dance with “commonly accepted standards in international corporate gov-
ernance” and the availability of cumulative voting were like little red flags
attracting the momentary attention of the international capital markets.
However, as an effective mechanism of promoting better governance in
the corporate sector domestically, they were irrelevant.
In addition to invoking the signalling effect, there may also have been
a certain amount of gaming of the corporate governance ratings exercises.
The OECD Principles 1999, the revised 2004 Principles, and the legal ori-
gins indicia figure prominently in the context of the FSAPs conducted by
the IMF and the World Bank, as well as in various privately conducted
corporate governance rating exercises.  Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pis-
tor recount an anecdote about Chinese companies law reforms designed
to score points and improve ratings in these exercises.48
Here is where the capital markets may, ironically, be producing a per-
verse effect on corporate governance initiatives.  International capital mar-
46. For a more extensive description of experiments with cumulative voting in
Asia, see Jordan, supra note 20; see also Jordan, supra note 32.
47. The author participated in a “road show” meeting in New York City in
2002 where the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA) was making a presentation
to major U.S. institutional investors on its new corporate governance board, the
Novo Mercado.  One institutional investor inquired as to whether Brazil had cumu-
lative voting provisions in its corporate law (it did not).  What the investor failed to
realize, and what the BOVESPA failed to mention, was that pending legislation in
Brazil was to provide a mechanism for direct board representation by minority
shareholders holding a certain percentage of shares, in fact, a much better, sub-
stantive right than a cumulative voting mechanism.  For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the Novo Mercado, see Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 31, at 341.
48. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD 248 n.18 (2008) (“We were amused by a scholar from Beijing
who began a presentation about China’s new Company Law by highlighting the
fact that it scores significantly higher on the investor protection index of La Porta
et al. than the law it replaced.  But he noted a bit wistfully that the index had been
recently updated and that the new law would no longer score as high.”).
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kets have been so dominated in recent years by Anglo-American law and
practices that the spill-over into other law and practice, regardless of legal
tradition, has been inevitable.  Some spill-over may be ineffective because
the mechanisms introduced are incompatible with or unknown to the un-
derlying legal system—fiduciary duties for example.  In other cases, the
transplanted legal concepts may contradict civil or commercial code provi-
sions.  The newly introduced elements may then be simply trumped, ren-
dered ineffective, by older civil code (or even constitutional) provisions
which are higher in the legal hierarchy.  In the case of China, ineffective
or irrelevant corporate governance mechanisms are likely being adopted
as a means of signalling to the international capital markets and engaging
in the corporate governance rating game.
B. Germany—Corporate Governance as Political Gesture
Some corporate governance mechanisms, voluntary codes possibly
among them, may in fact be detrimental to developing better corporate
governance.  Deliberately introducing an ineffective, but internationally
recognized, corporate governance delivery mechanism such as a voluntary
code may permit political interests to divert attention from approaches
which could be more effective, but also more disruptive to the cozy corpo-
rate and political status quo.49  Such strategies are not restricted to devel-
oping economies.
The German corporate governance code, introduced in 2002, pro-
vides an example.  Justice Minister Herta Daubler-Gmelin “argued that
while the code contained no sanctions for non-compliance, ‘the capital
market will provide very effective sanctions’ for those that chose to ignore
it.”50  A voluntary code, introduced not by industry, but by government
initiative, in one of the leading European codal countries.  The Financial
Times editorial writer was skeptical at the time of introduction of the volun-
tary code, stating flatly that it would do “little to nudge German corporate
governance towards a more investor-friendly model.”51  This skepticism
was borne out by subsequent events; three years later the voluntary code
49. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 22.
50. See Sven Clausen & Hugh Williamson, Berlin Announces Voluntary Business
Code, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 7 (discussing Germany’s announcement of vol-
untary business code); see also Jordan & Lubrano, supra note 31, at 327.
51. See Editorial, German Takeover, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 12 (“Common
rules for corporate takeovers have become a test for Europe’s capacity to reform
itself.  Thanks to the conservatism of German business and the refusal of the Berlin
government to look beyond narrow political interests, is one that Europe is likely
to fail.  Despite the eye-catching call for greater disclosure of executive pay, Ger-
many’s new voluntary code, published yesterday, does little to nudge German cor-
porate governance towards a more investor-friendly model.”); see also Jordan &
Lubrano, supra note 31, at 327.
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was considered “a failure” and plans were afoot to replace it with written
legislation.52
It is likely that in introducing a voluntary code of corporate govern-
ance at the time that it did, Germany too was signalling—not to the inter-
national capital markets—but rather to its neighbors in the European
Union, that it would engage in the corporate governance dialogue.  Ger-
man interests in protecting Volkswagen from unwanted takeover attempts
had been credited with the defeat of the then proposed Takeover Direc-
tive in the European Parliament.  It had taken nearly thirteen years for the
proposed Directive to make it as far as the Parliament, where its approval
had been more or less taken for granted.  The wasted time and effort was a
source of much criticism directed towards Germany.  So it is possible to
speculate that the speedy subsequent introduction of this corporate gov-
ernance code was an attempt to make amends.  That the voluntary code
would likely change little in the political and commercial status quo may
have been a collateral advantage.
C. Italy—Inadvertent Chaos
There is certainly reason to believe that, for different reasons, both
China and Germany were advertently making use of the implementation
of various internationally recognized corporate governance mechanisms
in a calculated manner.  Italy, on the other hand, was engaging in a some-
what uncoordinated flurry of legislative and other activity in response to
the debates raging internationally on corporate governance.  Alternative
models of corporate governance were being created under Italian law.  Ac-
cording to Federico Ghezzi and Marco Ventoruzzo at Bocconi University
in Milan, by 2006 Italy was experiencing both “the good and evil of the
‘globalization’ of corporate governance.”53  The result, according to
Ghezzi and Ventoruzzo, was a “Tower of Babel.”54
52. See Patrick Jenkins & Hugh Williamson, Executives Under Pressure on Pay,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at 16 (“A group of 21 Social Democrat members of the
German parliament will today table a draft bill to force company executives to
disclose details of their remuneration and bring to an end a deep-rooted culture of
secrecy in the country’s boardrooms.  The bill, drafted in consultation with corpo-
rate governance expert Theodor Baums, comes in response to what the legislators
see as the failure of a three-year-old voluntary code to prompt disclosure.”).
53. See Federico Ghezzi & Marco Ventoruzzo, Presentation to The World
Bank: Boards of Directors and Audit Committees in Italian Listed Corporations
(Feb. 22, 2006) (on file with author).
54. Id. at 2.
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TOWER OF BABEL ILLUSTRATION55
Italy presents a striking illustration of the collision of Anglo-American
corporate governance mechanisms with a continental European legal sys-
tem, and the potentially deleterious results of indiscriminate mixing and
matching of legal concepts drawn from very different systems and con-
texts.  Again, according to Ghezzi and Ventoruzzo, duplicative and con-
flicting rules in certain areas generated uncertainty.  The “agency
problem” addressed by Anglo-American corporate governance mecha-
nisms was different in Italy (as it is different in many other places in the
world); because of the predominance of majority, often family, controlled
businesses, the problematic relationship was between majority and minor-
ity shareholders, not managers and widely dispersed shareholders.  There
was a culture of weak institutional investors.  The legislative and other cor-
porate governance initiatives in Italy were producing neither top down
harmonization nor effective regulatory competition.  All in all, according
to Ghezzi and Ventoruzzo, “a recipe for disaster.”56
VII. CADBURY TWENTY YEARS ON
Twenty years later, the debate on corporate governance struggles on,
somewhat overshadowed by the global financial crisis, but relatively undi-
minished.  The legal origins literature has been subjected to serious scru-
tiny, and is, to all extents and purposes, dead.  “While follow-up papers
55. Which they illustrated very cleverly. Id.
56. See id. at 26 (examining legislative and other corporate governance initia-
tives in Italy).
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recently appeared that use more refined indices to support the link from
legal origins to investor protection to finance postulated in LLSV [the le-
gal origins literature] . . . the collapse of the results that inspired this en-
tire line of research is at least remarkable.”57
The Cadbury Report itself has spawned dozens of voluntary codes of
corporate governance in countries around the world.58  Its “comply or ex-
plain” implementation methodology pops up everywhere.  Many of these
codes are easy “show” pieces of no practical import.  However, in other
places the corporate governance debate spurred real innovation and
change, for example, in Brazil, with the Novo Mercado, or Corporate Gov-
ernance Listing Board.59
A. OECD Principles
The OECD learned from its experiences with the OECD Principles
1999.  Five years later, the Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance (2004) (the “Revised OECD Principles 2004”) appeared.  Impor-
tantly, the Revised OECD Principles 2004 move from the proposition that
there is “no single model of good corporate governance.”60  The Revised
OECD Principles 2004 are more nuanced and balanced, reflecting the les-
sons learned through their implementation in the course of the IMF/
World Bank FSAP exercises and the OECD’s own regional corporate gov-
ernance roundtables.  They are expressive of the reality and variety of cor-
porate experience.  Tellingly, there has been no pressing need for
subsequent revisions.
However, a second complementary set of OECD Principles appeared
in 2005 dealing with the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.
In the course of the FSAP exercises, the prevalence of state-owned enter-
prises (in both developed and developing economies) and the corporate
57. Holger Spamann, “Law and Finance” Revisited 3 (Harvard Law Sch. John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/
Spamann_12.pdf.
58. See Index of Codes, supra note 26 (listing national corporate governance R
codes and reports).
59. The introduction of the Novo Mercado premium listing board in 2001,
with its novel investor protection mechanisms, appears to have had a direct impact
in stimulating Brazil’s then moribund capital markets.  Between 1996 and 2000,
there had been only three IPOs on the BOVESPA.  In 2007, there were sixty-four
and between 2004 and 2011, the great majority of them have occurred on the
Novo Mercado.  The average capital raised by offerings in the three years to 2007
was BRL764 million, compared to BRL3.15 billion between 2008 and 2009. See Pa-
trı´cia Pellini, Issuer Regulation & Guidance Manager, BM&FBovespa, Presentation
at the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance: Stock Exchanges as
an Engine for Corporate Governance Improvements (Nov. 30 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/17/49287485.pdf (discussing these statistics).
60. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corpo-
rateaffairs/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf (moving away from
proposition that there is “no single model of good corporate governance”).
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governance challenges that they present became glaringly obvious.  The
OECD Principles 1999, based as they were on a primarily U.S. model of
the corporation, were inadequate to address the questions raised in the
presence of state-owned enterprises.  To its credit, the OECD surmounted
ideological reticence in some quarters,61 to study and formulate guide-
lines for corporate governance of state-owned enterprises.
B. United States
In the United States, despite a lively transatlantic dialogue on corpo-
rate governance, there was no single phenomenon comparable to the
Cadbury Report.  Partly this is due to the complexity of the corporate and
legislative environment and the multitude of competing voices.  Listing
rules, industry practices and organisations, a heavy federal regulatory ap-
paratus overlaying state incorporation statutes and judiciaries, the pres-
ence of vocal and powerful institutional investors such as CalPers, and
iconic personalities such as the Sage of Omaha,62 all play a part in the
cacophony on corporate governance.  Then in 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act was enacted, which was the first major piece of federal “corporate gov-
ernance” legislation in decades.  Interest in voluntary codes of corporate
governance never took root.  The debate on corporate governance, and
how best to promote it, grinds along nevertheless with shareholders per-
sistently pushing and straining for purchase on a sometimes barren and
rocky landscape.
In 2010, the New York Stock Exchange commissioned yet another re-
port on corporate governance.63  From the introductory comments, it is
obvious that it did so reluctantly, seeing no compelling need to reopen
issues which had already been quite exhaustively explored in the previous
decade.  The global financial crisis however prompted reconsideration of
a wide variety of issues, corporate governance among them.  The conclu-
sion was that the “current governance system generally works well.”64  In a
nod to more modern sensibilities regarding stakeholders though, it did
state that the fundamental objective of corporate governance was to pro-
mote “long-term sustainable growth in value for shareholders and, by ex-
tension, other stakeholders.”65  Thus, a powerful institution gave explicit
61. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (2005), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf (noting that United States did not
participate in formulation of 2005 OECD corporate governance guidelines).  It is
somewhat ironic that barely three years later the United States would be home to a
number of very large state-owned enterprises, such as General Motors.
62. Warren Buffett.
63. See generally N.Y. STOCK EXCH. COMM’N ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, RE-
PORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2010), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/CCGReport.pdf (providing com-
prehensive review of corporate governance principles).
64. Id. at 32.
65. Id. at 25.
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acknowledgement that shareholder wealth maximization was not the only
benchmark against which to assess corporate decision-making.
C. Germany
In Germany, there is a new Corporate Governance Code 2010 (the
“German Code 2010”), which reverts more to form.66  Much of this Ger-
man Code 2010 is a restatement of existing statutory law, indicative of the
German conviction that corporate governance is, for the most part, ade-
quately dealt with in existing legislation.  The German Code 2010 applies
only to German incorporated public, listed companies, and therefore
avoids the unfortunate (from a European perspective) extraterritorial
reach of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 corporate governance legislation.
The Code reaffirms the iconic German dual board structure and principle
of co-determination (worker representation on the supervisory board).
The Cadbury Report though continues to exercise its pervasive influence;
there are “supplementary” provisions, indicated in the German Code 2010
by “shall” terminology.  In these cases, the “comply or explain” methodol-
ogy of Cadbury is invoked.  Additionally, there are some provisions that
are suggestions only, thrown in for good measure.
D. European Union
At the EU level, a new window is opening on the international dis-
course on corporate governance.  For much of the last twenty years, given
the dominance of Anglo-American voices in the corporate governance de-
bate, at the pan-European level, Europe has struggled to play catch-up.
Certainly, voluntary codes of corporate governance popped up all over
Europe.  Stock exchanges, ever in conversation with one another, picked
up on various listing rule initiatives (and “comply or explain”).  Legislative
initiatives flowing from the Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 corporate governance
legislation in the United States were tried out at the EU level, with mixed
results.67
More lately though, as experience with corporate governance tech-
niques has grown, uniquely European approaches have been developing.
At the member state level, a multitude of legislative “fixes” have been put
in place, many of which would be unthinkable in the United States and
controversial, to say the least, in the U.K.  For example, supported by em-
66. See generally GOV’T COMM’N, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
(2010), available at http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/binary/gdb_
content_pool/imported_files/public_files/10_downloads/14_investor_relations/
15_corporate_governance/DCGK_mai_2010.pdf (presenting essential statutory
regulations for management and supervision of German listed companies and con-
taining internationally and nationally recognized standards for good and responsi-
ble governance).
67. A proposal for mandatory audit committees for European public compa-
nies (inspired by Sarbanes-Oxley 2002) and floated by the European Commission
in Brussels was defeated at the European Parliament.
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pirical evidence on firm performance and psychological studies indicating
the value of diversity, especially gender diversity, in decision-making, a
mandatory percentage of women on corporate boards is now required in
some member states68 and is being contemplated at the EU level.69
Last year, in 2011, a provocative EU Green Paper on Corporate Gov-
ernance (“Green Paper”) appeared, eliciting a spirited response from the
Committee of Company Law Experts composed of Paul L. Davies (Univer-
sity of Oxford), Klaus J. Hopt (Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law; European Corporate Governance Institute
(ECGI)), Guido A. Ferrarini (University of Genoa; ECGI), Alain Pie-
trancosta, (Sorbonne Law School), Rolf R.  Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski
(Komisja Kodyfikacyjna Prawa Cywilnego; Sołtysin´ski Kawecki & Szleˆzak,
Legal Advisors), Jaap W. Winter (Duisenberg School of Finance; De Brauw
Blackstone Westbroek), and Eddy Wymeersch (Ghent University; ECGI).
Demonstrating the persistence and continuity of the Cadbury Report in
the modern corporate governance dialogue, the Green Paper opens with
the Cadbury Report definition of corporate governance: “Corporate gov-
ernance is traditionally defined as the system by which companies are di-
rected and controlled and as a set of relationships between a company’s
management, its board, its shareholders and its other stakeholders.”70
But from there on, much is new in this wide-ranging and thought
provoking study.  The earlier knee-jerk reliance on the Anglo-American
corporate governance framework that Cadbury initiated has been re-
placed by the search for principled approaches that would work in a Euro-
pean environment.  The Green Paper proceeds from the premise that the
EU is inherently international and diverse.  It notes that the corporate gov-
68. See Yvonne Roberts, You’re Fired, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2008), www.guardian.
co.uk/lifeandstyle/2008/mar/06/women.discriminationatwork (noting that Nor-
way’s 2003 amendment to Public Limited Liabilities Act No 45/1997 (1997) (Nor)
§ 6-11a introduced 40% quota that was to be phased in by 2008).  [Law 2011-103 of
January 27, 2011, Concerning the Representation of Women and Men on Boards
of Directors and of Supervisory Boards and Workplace Equality], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA RE´PUBLIQUE FRANC¸AISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 21, 2012, p.
3 (discussing French law that recommended 20% of board members be female
within three years); see also Daniel Flynn, France Sets Quota for Women on Big Compa-
nies’ Boards, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2011), www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/13/us-
france-equality-idUSTRE70C5ZA20110113 (discussing French law forcing large
companies to reserve at least 40% of boardroom positions for women within six
years).
69. See Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework, at 6–7, COM (2011)
164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper], available at http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0164:FIN:EN:PDF (discussing
issue of gender diversity in economic decision-making); cf. Paul L. Davies et al.,
Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper “The EU Corporate Gov-
ernance Framework” 8 (July 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1912548& (discussing
whether listed companies should be required to ensure better gender balance on
boards).
70. Green Paper, supra note 69, at 2.
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ernance requirements applicable to EU-listed companies have become a
mixture of “hard and soft law,” with voluntary codes of corporate govern-
ance falling into the latter category.  The operation of “hard and soft law”
in the commercial law context has garnered a fair amount of recent atten-
tion.  It is hard not to surmise that the extraordinary proliferation of vol-
untary codes has been a contributing factor to this surge in interest in the
effectiveness of non-legislative norms.
Ultimately though, while acknowledging the presence of much “soft
law” in corporate governance, the Green Paper is critical of the “comply or
explain” approach associated with the Cadbury Report.  “Comply or ex-
plain” has not delivered the desired results in crucial areas; it does not
necessarily work where it is most needed.
E. United Kingdom
And in the U.K., where it all began?  The original Cadbury Report of
1992 was not uncontroversial; it was followed by a number of reports and a
succession of voluntary codes that picked up on the current issues and
debates and grew by accretion.  These subsequent codes were somewhat
unimaginatively called, in each case, “The Combined Code.”71  However,
in 2010 there was a break in this process with the appearance of two new
voluntary codes, the U.K. Code of Corporate Governance 2010 (“U.K.
Code 2010”), continuing the tradition of the combined codes, and the
brand new U.K. Stewardship Code 2010 (applicable to institutional
investors).
Although the U.K. Code 2010 reflects its lineage going straight back
to the Cadbury Report (by reiterating its definition of corporate govern-
ance), this document is a much different creature.  Gone is the two page
“Code of Best Practice,” replaced by a detailed and differentiated ap-
proach to corporate governance structured along the lines of the OECD
Principles 2004.
Of course, a great deal has changed in the U.K. since the Cadbury
Report appeared in 1992, most notably a new Companies Act 2006 (U.K.),
which at its introduction was touted as the first major rethinking of U.K.
companies law in 140 years.72  One of the more interesting aspects of this
71. The reports that culminated in the Combined Code were as follows: DI-
RECTORS’ REMUNERATION, REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD
GREENBURY (1995) [hereinafter GREENBURY REPORT]; COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter HAMPEL REPORT]; DEREK HIGGS,
REVIEW OF THE ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS (2002)
[hereinafter HIGGS REVIEW].
72. See Patricia Hewitt, Foreword to U.K. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS., COMPANY
LAW REFORM 3 (2005) (“Britain was among the first nations to establish rules for
the operation of companies, and our law remains a model for many nations over-
seas. . . .  [O]ver time the law can become outdated, and risks presenting obstacles
to the ways companies want and need to do business in today’s world.  We are
determined to avoid this.  That is why we established the Company Law
Review . . . .”).
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new legislation is the statutory statement of directors’ duty of care,73 which
enumerates the considerations that must be taken into account in the de-
cision-making process.  This long list of considerations, which includes the
interests of employees and creditors for example, demonstrates the impact
of stakeholder theory (and likely continental European perspectives) and
captures many of the considerations detailed by Kenneth Scott in his defi-
nition of corporate governance.
In addition to a new Companies Act, there are more EU level legisla-
tive instruments that must be taken into consideration.  In the last decade,
the EU has been churning out Directive after Directive affecting public
and listed companies.  The EU imperative is now even stronger, given that
it has turned to the use of regulations (of immediate and direct applica-
tion in member states) rather than Directives implemented at the member
state level in their own fashion.  The result in the U.K. has been a much
greater interaction of older style British approaches (informed by centu-
ries of self-regulation and industry standards of behavior) with “hard law.”
But the U.K. Code 2012 still relies on the “comply or explain” methodol-
ogy of the voluntary code of corporate governance, with little indication of
a move away from it.  Last year, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) the
monitoring agency for the two new codes, the corporate governance code
and the stewardship code, released a one-year update on their
implementation.74
73. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.) (listing section on duty to
promote success of company).
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing
so have regard (amongst other matters) to—
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with
suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community
and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for
high standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist
of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members,
subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to
achieving those purposes.
The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or
rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or
act in the interests of creditors of the company
Id.
74. See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE 2011: THE IMPACT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UK CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE AND STEWARDSHIP CODES (2011), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/getattach
ment/5f4fada9-2a88-43a4-bbec-be15b6519e79/Developments-in-Corporate-Gov-
ernance-2011-The-impact-and-implementation-of-the-UK-Corporate-Governance-
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In a poke at the more European (and perhaps American) approaches
to corporate governance, the FRC noted the “advantages this [U.K. code-
based approach] has over slower-changing law-based systems,” in particu-
lar, its responsiveness to a rapidly changing business environment.75
As in the past with the various iterations of the Cadbury Report, the
U.K. Code 2010 will continue to be a “work in progress” subject to contin-
uous tinkering and fine-tuning.  However, the FRC did state in its 2011
report that it intended to leave the code alone for the next year or two so
as to let it settle in.76
VIII. CONCLUSION
So the legacy of the Cadbury Report lives on in the U.K. with no dimi-
nution in the appeal of its voluntary code and its comply or explain ap-
proach to corporate governance.  But there are several clouds looming on
the horizon.  Comply or explain and voluntary codes of corporate govern-
ance appear to have run their course elsewhere in the world.  Even in the
U.K., legislative initiatives on the corporate governance front, either do-
mestically initiated or EU-driven,77 may be sapping the voluntary code of
its vitality.  Although the conviction remains strong in the U.K. that the
flexibility and opportunity for easy, rapid adjustments are strengths of the
voluntary code approach to corporate governance, the constantly evolving
nature of the U.K. voluntary codes may, in fact, be an indication of a deep-
rooted problem: Are these voluntary codes of corporate governance,
which give so much deference to industry sentiment and conventional wis-
dom, in a constant state of flux because they are not getting it right?
and-Stewardship-Codes.aspx (drawing on new and publicly available research,
study of annual reports and Stewardship Code statements, and many conversations
with companies, investors and other interested parties).
75. See id. at 1.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Especially, given the increasing use of directly applicable EU Regulation
of a more insistent, mandatory nature.
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